弥合差距：评估美国商界对中美竞争的支持（英）.pdf

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1、C O R P O R AT I O NBONNY LIN, HOWARD J. SHATZ, NATHAN CHANDLER, CRISTINA L. GARAFOLA, EUGENIU HAN, ANDY LAW, KING MALLORY, ZEV WINKELMANBridging the GapAssessing U.S. Business Community Support for U.S.-China CompetitionResearch ReportRR-A1417-1 Bridging the Gap Cover.indd All Pages5/5/22 9:47 AMFo

2、r more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1417-1.About RANDThe RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,

3、nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org.Research IntegrityOur mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the hig

4、hest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest

5、 through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies t

6、o ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/principles.RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2022 RAND Corporation is a registered trademark.Librar

7、y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN: 978-1-9774-0894-5Cover: designer: Carol Ponce; top: ffikretow/Getty Images; bottom left: NanoStockk/Getty Images; bottom center: Olivier Le Moal/ Getty Images; bottom right: crstrbrt/Getty Images.Limited Print and E

8、lectronic Distribution RightsThis publication and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to its webpage on rand.org i

9、s encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research products for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.iiiAbout This ReportStarting with the administration of President

10、Donald Trump and continuing into the administration of Pres-ident Joseph Biden, the United States has placed increasing restrictions on economic exchange with China. How does the U.S. business community view these policies, and does it broadly support increased efforts to counter problematic Chinese

11、 economic behavior? If not, how could the U.S. government implement policy to better incorporate business interests, address corporate concerns, and gain greater cooperation from the U.S. business community? In this report, we attempt to answer these questions that are central to whether the U.S. go

12、vernment has crafted an overall economic strategy or approach to China that is sustainable and feasible. The views of the U.S. business community on how the United States should deal with China are an overlooked and underappreciated topic. The United States may find it difficult to compete against C

13、hina without support from the U.S. business community.This report should be of value to the national security community and interested members of the general publicespecially those with an interest in U.S.-China dynamics. The research was conducted during fiscal year 2020 and prior to the 2020 U.S.

14、presidential election. FundingFunding for this research was made possible by the independent research and development provisions of the RAND Corporations contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers.AcknowledgmentsThis report would n

15、ot have been possible without significant assistance, contributions, and insight from a number of individuals. First and foremost, we owe a special debt of gratitude to the dozens of U.S. business community and industry leaders we interviewed and consulted for the research for this report. We thank

16、Lisa Jaycox, director of RAND-Initiated Research at the RAND Corporation, and Mike Spirtas, associate director of RANDs International Security and Defense Policy Center, for their advice and guidance throughout the development of this report. Our colleagues Anita Chandra, Rafiq Dossani, Dalia Dassa

17、Kaye, and Charles Ries were generous with their insights and contacts. We would not have been able to field or analyze the results of our national survey of U.S. individuals without the help of Matthew Baird, Karen Edwards, David Grant, and Joshua Russell-Fritch. Karishma Patel of RAND provided esse

18、ntial assistance in helping us vali-date the results of the text analysis of earnings calls. We especially thank Keith Crane and Steven Popper for their detailed and tremendously helpful reviews of an earlier draft of this report; their comments and sugges-tions greatly strengthened it. We benefited

19、 from proofreading and editing by Kofi Amofa, Rosa Maria Torres, Francisco Walter, and Natalie Ziegler. Matthew Byrd guided the manuscript through the RAND production process, Brian Bendlin provided expert copyediting, and Carol Ponce designed the cover. Any errors of fact and interpretation remain

20、our own.vSummaryDuring its four years, the administration of President Donald Trump pursued an enhancedand, in some ways, novelset of policies to confront China over its economic policies, including Chinas theft of technol-ogy and intellectual property (IP), limitations to market access for U.S. bus

21、inesses, and other anticompeti-tive behaviors. How did the U.S. business community view the Trump administrations economic policies focused on the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and did it broadly support increased U.S. efforts to coun-ter problematic PRC economic behavior? If not, how could the U

22、.S. government implement policy to better achieve policy goals and at the same time address corporate concerns? In this report we attempt to answer these questions that are central to whether the U.S. government has crafted an overall economic strategy or approach to China that is sustainable and fe

23、asible. The views of the business community on how the United States should deal with China are an overlooked and underappreciated topic, and the United States may find it difficult to compete against China without support from the business community.This report analyzes how the U.S. business commun

24、ityspecifically, the manufacturing, technology, and financial sectorsviewed the Trump administrations China policies through several different lenses: (1) from the perspective of individuals working in different industries, (2) from the perspective of different firms over time, and (3) from the pers

25、pective of specific industry sectors and subsectors. The analysis focuses on Trump administration actions toward China from 2017 through the fall of 2020. The RAND Corporation team concluded the majority of the research for this report in October 2020 and before the November 2020 presidential electi

26、ons.National Survey of Views on ChinaWe conducted a national survey of U.S. adults from March to April 2020 to assess individual-level views on China. We find that the U.S. public generally views China as both a military or security threat and an eco-nomic opportunity (Table S.1). The U.S. public is

27、 generally supportive of restricting U.S. corporate products or services to China and boycotting problematic PRC products, suggesting a willingness to curb potential economic gains from China to protect U.S. interests and values. At the same time, the majority of U.S. survey respondents did not supp

28、ort limiting Chinese workers and students in the United States. This suggests that any U.S. government effort to limit PRC student and worker visas is likely to be met by public resistance. There is little evidence that individual views on China are linked to an industry of employment, although we d

29、id find some evidence to suggest that those in the financial sector were less likely to support limits on PRC nationals studying or working in the United States. Earnings Calls to Analyze Business “Sentiment” Toward ChinaWe also examined how different industries and subsectors responded to the Trump

30、 administrations actions against China by analyzing the transcripts of quarterly corporate earnings calls from companies in the Stan-dard & Poors (S&P) 500 Index and the Russell 2000 Index. We assessed what the corporate earnings calls conveyed about the companys views about China or its business pr

31、ospects with or in China. Figure S.1 shows the results for the S&P 500 companies. We find that manufacturing and technology firms had earnings calls that voiced more concern with (had decreasing sentiment regarding) China-related operations from 2018 to late 2019. This suggests that manufacturing an

32、d technology firms may have faced more difficulties and costs from the policies the Trump Bridging the Gapviadministration implemented with respect to China. In contrast, large financial companies listed in the S&P 500 saw a dip in sentiment in early 2018 (compared with late 2017) and subsequent inc

33、rease in positive sen-timent from 2018 to mid-2020. This suggests that financial firms could have viewed the actions taken by the Trump administration as providing them with slightly more opportunities or benefits compared with costs. We do not find any significant difference between how large U.S.

34、firms and small U.S. firms (based on TABLE S.1Survey Results for Individual Views of ChinaQuestionsAnswers (%)YesNoQuestion 1. Do you see China as a security or economic threat to or opportunity for the U.S.?China is a security threat75.2China is an economic threat36.2China is an economic opportunit

35、y48.9Question 2. Should the U.S. government stop U.S. companies from providing services or goods to Chinese actors that undermine U.S. interests or values even if it weakens the U.S. economy? (Example: The U.S. government should stop U.S. companies from selling to Chinese companies that provide tech

36、nology to censor the Chinese internet.)59.739.6Question 3. Foreign workers and students are important contributors to U.S. innovation, but a small portion may illegally take innovation back to their home country, and others may return to their home country with new skills and compete against the Uni

37、ted States. Should the United States limit Chinese workers and students even if it weakens the U.S. economy because of less innovation?35.164.2Question 4. The U.S. government has said that Huawei, a Chinese telephone company, could be collecting user information and intelligence on behalf of the Chi

38、nese military. Huawei has disputed such allegations and many countries use Huawei phones. Are you willing to buy a phone produced by a Chinese technology company with potential links to the Chinese military?17.182.6SOURCE: Authors calculations from the RAND Corporation, “RAND American Life Panel,” w

39、ebpage, undated.FIGURE S.1Average China-Related Sentiment by S&P Sector, 201720202017Q12017Q22017Q32017Q42018Q12018Q22018Q32018Q42019Q12019Q22019Q32019Q42020Q12020Q20.450.400.350.300.250.200.150.100.050Average sentiment scoreSOURCE: Authors analysis of earnings calls from LexisNexiss Fair Disclosure

40、 Wire.NOTE: Q1 = first quarter; Q2 = second quarter; Q3 = third quarter; Q4 = fourth quarter.ManufacturingTechnologyFinancialsSummaryviithe Russell 2000 Index) viewed China-related activities. Furthermore, we note that there are large standard deviations to our estimates, and so while the point esti

41、mates differ, there may have been little difference in sentiment by sector.How Sectors Viewed the Trump Administrations China Policies and Their ImpactFinally, we assessed how each sector viewed the Trump administrations China policies and whether the poli-cies had a generally positive or negative i

42、mpact on the sector. Our research involved looking across different business functions and interviewing nearly 30 industry experts. We find that while companies and industry experts were broadly supportive of the Trump administrations goals to level the playing field for American companies and count

43、er problematic PRC practices, there were significant concerns about the unilateral and seemingly ad hoc tactics that the administration took with limited consultation with businesses. The manu-facturing sector was negatively affected the most by the Trump administrations actions while the technology

44、 sectorboth on the hardware and software sidesalso felt largely negative impacts. The effects of the Trump administrations policies were more mixed (and overall neutral) with respect to the financial sector, and there is debate as to whether the Trump administration successfully encouraged China to

45、accelerate the opening of its financial markets or if Beijing was already on track to do so to support its own domestic agenda anyway. Table S.2 summarizes the findings. TABLE S.2Impact of the Trump Administrations China Policies on U.S. Business SectorsBusiness FunctionsManufacturingTechnologyFinan

46、ceHardwareSoftwareOperationsNegativeNegativeNeutralNeutral/positive?Sales and marketingNegativeNegativeNegativeNeutral/positive?FinanceNegativeNegativeNegative(Not applicable)Research and developmentNegativeNeutralNeutralNeutralEmployment and human resourcesNegativeNegativeNegativeNegativeOverallNeg

47、ativeNegativeNegativeNeutralRecommendationsChina is intertwined with the U.S. and global economies. The United States does not have unlimited leverage on its own, and any policy is likely to have costs. While the Trump administrations policies can certainly be criticized, arriving at effective alter

48、natives is not a simple task. With that in mind, our research suggests a number of recommendations for how the administration of President Joseph Biden could improve its ability to work with the U.S. business community to advance U.S. economic interests and counter problematic PRC economic behavior:

49、 Adopt an economic strategy that balances efforts to counter China with investments in strengthen-ing and sustaining U.S. economic and technological leadership. The Trump administrations eco-Bridging the Gapviiinomic approach to compete with China was largely focused on countering China via imposing

50、 uni-lateral tariffs on Chinese trade, preventing Chinese control of sensitive U.S. technology, and limiting transfers of U.S. technology to China. The Trump administration sought to invest domestically to strengthen U.S. technology leadership in select areas, such as artificial intelligence and qua